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I. INTRODUCTION 
Outer space is widely considered to be something of a global commons, 
an international domain outside the jurisdiction of any country1 that “belongs 
to no state and is, in law, as such not subject to appropriation, though its re-
sources are.”2 This is also reflected by key provisions of the 1967 Outer Space 
Treaty,3 the most comprehensive convention on outer space and space activi-
ties, notably that “[o]uter space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, 
is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of 
use or occupation, or by any other means”4 and that “[o]uter space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by 
all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in 
accordance with international law . . . .”5 
The governance of such a “global commons” therefore cannot follow from 
the authority of a single nation. Such governance requires a foundation in in-
ternational law, read effectively international treaty law. While customary in-
ternational law constitutes the other primary source of international law,6 due 
to its fluidity, as long as not codified, it would be rather ill equipped to offer 
something like a governance structure at the required level of precision. 
It is through such a structure, that the substance of any limitations to the 
baseline freedom of activities (“exploration and use,” in the terms of Article I 
of the Outer Space Treaty7) in outer space would be provided. The substance 
would come from international treaty law, such as the Outer Space Treaty 
itself, or in this context possibly also as coming from customary international 
law, general principles of international law,8 or any other relevant sources of 
international law. 
 
 1 Outer Space, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2004). 
 2 Bin Cheng, Nationality for Spacecraft?, in AIR AND SPACE L.: DE LEGE FERENDA 203, 
204 (Henri Abraham Wassenbergh et al. eds., 1992). 
 3 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 
1969, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 206 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter 
Outer Space Treaty]; see also 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW (Stephan Hobe et 
al. eds., 2009). 
 4 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. II. 
 5 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art I. The clause further provides for “free access 
to all areas of celestial bodies.” 
 6 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b). This clause is widely rec-
ognized as the most authoritative statement on the sources of international law. 
 7 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. I (describing such activities in terms of 
“exploration and use”). 
 8 Id. at art. III (stating that the general principles of international law have been 
“imported” into space law by virtue of Article III of the Outer Space Treaty, which 
provides: “States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of 
2020 STRUCTURING THE GOVERNANCE 647 
Consequently, as states are still the primary makers9 and breakers10 of in-
ternational law, the core of the governance structure for outer space and ac-
tivities conducted in that realm lies in the role that each state has to fulfill with 
respect to activities by other categories of legal subjects active in this “global 
commons,” notably intergovernmental organizations and private sector enti-
ties. That role is essentially defined by a limited set of clauses of the Outer 
Space Treaty, some of which have been further elaborated, notably by the 
1972 Liability Convention11 and the 1975 Registration Convention.12 
II. THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL SPACE 
LAW: THE PROBLEMS 
The most important clause regarding the structure of governance under in-
ternational space law emanates from Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, 
which provides first that “States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international 
responsibility for national activities in outer space . . . whether such activities 
are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, 
and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the 
provisions set forth in the present Treaty.”13 In other words, states are required 
to ensure that private sector entities engaged in activities in outer space com-
ply with the rules of the Outer Space Treaty, and by inference of all of inter-
national space law,14 to the extent they are “national activities” in outer 
space.15 Precisely for this purpose, Article VI also “require[s] authorization 
 
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international 
law . . . .”). 
 9 Meaning that states are the entities which jointly create international law by agreeing 
to treaties and conducting themselves in such a way as to give rise to state practice and 
opinio juris, the two standard elements of customary international law. 
 10 Meaning that states are the entities, usually exclusively or at least predominantly, ad-
dressed by those treaties and rules of customary international law that are enjoying the 
rights and being subjected to the obligations flowing therefrom. See, e.g., Frans von der 
Dunk, International Space Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 29–34, 44–47 (Frans von 
der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015). 
 11 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 
1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Sept. 1, 1992) [hereinafter 
Liability Convention]. 
 12 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 
U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 (entered into force Sept. 15, 1976) [hereinafter Registration 
Convention]. 
 13 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. VI (emphasis added). 
 14 Cf. id. at art. III (“States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration 
and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with 
international law . . . .”). 
 15 Id. at art. VI. 
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and continuing supervision by the appropriate State” of “[t]he activities of 
non-governmental entities in outer space.”16 
As for international organizations, Article VI furthermore provides that 
“[w]hen activities are carried on in outer space . . . by an international organ-
ization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by 
the international organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty partici-
pating in such organization.”17 Article XIII of the Outer Space Treaty, per-
ceiving such organizations as offering a “framework” for states to conduct 
joint space activities, also requires that 
[a]ny practical questions arising in connection with activities 
carried on by international intergovernmental organizations in 
the exploration and use of outer space . . . shall be resolved by 
the States Parties to the Treaty either with the appropriate in-
ternational organization or with one or more States members 
of that international organization, which are Parties to this 
Treaty.18 
Taken together, therefore, these clauses clarify that states always retain at 
least a residual responsibility for ensuring that intergovernmental organiza-
tions of which they form part will comply with international space law. 
In short, states were bestowed with the task to act as supreme guardians of 
any relevant rules of international space law developed by them. Additionally, 
when or to the extent that other categories of entities were undertaking space 
activities, states were to be held more or less directly responsible if they some-
how failed to adequately exercise this guardianship. This balance represents 
the cornerstone of all governance of outer space and space activities. 
As for international organizations, this did not result in too many problems, 
partly because the amount of intergovernmental organizations truly active in 
outer space remained confined to more or less a handful of cases.19 On a more 
or less global scale this referred to INTELSAT20 and INMARSAT21 prior to 
 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at art. XIII. 
 19 For an overview of their role and status, see generally Frans von der Dunk, 
International Space Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 269–330 (Frans von der Dunk & 
Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015). 
 20 Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, 
Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 1220 U.N.T.S. 21 (entered into force Feb. 12, 1973) 
[hereinafter INTELSTAT]. 
 21 Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization, Sept. 3, 1976, 31 
U.S.T. 1, 1143 U.N.T.S. 105 (entered into force July 16, 1979) [hereinafter INMARSAT]. 
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their privatization in the late 1990s and early 2000s,22 as well as 
INTERSPUTNIK23 and INTERKOSMOS24; on a regional scale this referred 
to ESA25, EUTELSAT26 (prior to its privatization in the early 2000s), 
EUMETSAT27 and ARABSAT.28 In any event where such an intergovern-
mental organization might be accused of violating international space law, 
there was no doubt that the collective member states would be held directly 
responsible for such behavior. 
As for private enterprise, however, things turned out to be more compli-
cated. At the time the main space treaties were drafted in the late 1960s until 
mid-1970s, the participation of private entities in the space sector was basi-
cally limited to manufacturing hardware for use by governmental and some 
intergovernmental activity in outer space, rather than going into outer space 
themselves.29 The fairly summary set of provisions of the key UN space trea-
ties was seen as more than sufficient to deal with such participation, and to 
the extent any possible fundamental extension thereof to activities in outer 
space was foreseen, was simply expected to be sufficient to deal with those as 
 
 22 Both operational IGOs were transformed into private operators (INTELSAT resp. 
INMARSAT) supervised by residual IGOs (ITSO resp. IMSO). See  David Sagar & Patri-
cia McCormick, Inmarsat: In the Forefront of Mobile Satellite Communications, in THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE ORGANISATIONS: POLICY AND LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES 35, 49 (Patricia McCormick & Maury Mechanick eds., 2013); Patricia 
McCormick, Intelsat: Pre and Post-Private Equity Ownership, in THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE ORGANISATIONS: POLICY AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 81 (Pa-
tricia McCormick & Maury Mechanick eds., 2013). 
 23 Agreement on the Establishment of the INTERSPUTNIK International System and 
Organization of Space Communications, Nov. 15, 1971, 862 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 
July 12, 1972) [hereinafter INTERSPUTNIK]; SPACE LAW–BASIC LEGAL DOCUMENTS 
(Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter SPACE LAW]. 
 24 Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Exploitation and Use of Outer Space for 
Peaceful Purposes, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 24, 1972, 16 ILM 1 (entered into force Mar. 25, 
1977) [hereinafter INTERCOSMOS]. 
 25 Convention for the Establishment of European Space Agency, May 30, 1975, 1297 
U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Oct. 30, 1980); SPACE LAW, supra note 23. 
 26 Convention Establishing the European Telecommunications Satellite Organization, 
opened for signature July 15, 1982, U.N.T.S. 1990 (entered into force Sept. 1, 1985) [here-
inafter EUTELSAT]; SPACE LAW, supra note 23. 
 27 Convention for the Establishment of a European Organization for the Exploitation of 
Meteorological Satellites, May 24, 1983, 1434 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force June 19, 
1986) [hereinafter EUMETSTAT]. 
 28 Agreement of the Arab Corporation for Space Communications, opened for signature 
Apr. 14, 1976 (entered into force July 15, 1976) [hereinafter ARABSAT]; SPACE LAW, 
supra note 23. 
 29 Cf., e.g., Edith Walter, The Privatisation and Commercialisation of Outer Space, in 
OUTER SPACE IN SOCIETY, POLITICS AND LAW 494 (C. Brünner & A. Soucek eds., Springer-
Verlag/Wien 2011). 
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well.30 Starting slowly in the early 1970s and gathering pace with leaps and 
bounds throughout the 1980s and beyond, the private sector did engage itself 
more fundamentally in space activities—notably, at first, with satellite com-
munications and launching, and next to some extent satellite remote sensing.31 
However specific issues with this summary system of governance became ap-
parent even in the realm of structure.32 
The lack of a clear definition of what comprised “national” activities in 
outer space conducted by private enterprise, in other words of which catego-
ries of private actors any particular state would be held responsible for, in 
combination with the closely related but separately arranged liability for dam-
age caused by space activities, resulted in considerable confusion.33 Regard-
ing responsibility itself, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty itself only (re)es-
tablished the concept of state responsibility in the particular context of outer 
space activities while providing for a rather vaguely defined scope thereof by 
way of the concept of national activities in outer space.34 
First, it did not provide any details with respect to the consequences in law 
of a state having incurred such responsibility for violation of the rules of space 
law. Article III—as analyzed before effectively importing general public in-
ternational law into space law specifically—allows reference to the general 
principles of public international law regarding state responsibility. This 
brings up another problem.35 Under those principles, three standard forms of 
reparation redeem a State’s responsibility: (1) restitutio in integrum; (2) com-
pensation; and (3) satisfaction, in conjunction with cessation of any unlawful 
activities or promises to prevent recurrence in the future.36 As compensation 
 
 30 See, e.g., Michael Gerhard, Article VI, in COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 
384–85 (Stephan Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd, & Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds., BWV 2017); 
Armel Kerrest & Lesley Smith, Article VII, in COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 
359–61 (Stephan Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd, & Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds., BWV 2017). 
 31 For instance, a private satellite operator from State A launching its satellite from State 
B and operating its ground station from State C would raise the issue of which of those 
States would be responsible for the satellite’s activities and its conformity with interna-
tional space law pursuant to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty. Presumably only State 
B would qualify as the “launching State,” making it liable for damage caused by that sat-
ellite pursuant to Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and Articles I(c), II or III of the 
Liability Convention. 
 32 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3. 
 33 For instance, with a view to the scenario of note 31: Should State A be internationally 
responsible under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty because its national entity was con-
ducting the satellite operations, or should State B be so responsible because it also qualified 
as the launching State, or should State C be so responsible because the activities under 
scrutiny were actually conducted from its territory? 
 34 See generally Frans von der Dunk, International Space Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE 
LAW 46–47 (Frans von der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015) for further discussion. 
 35 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. III. 
 36 See ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
pt. 1, art. 1, 2, 4–6, 8, 11, 12, 13, and 31, Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-
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in many cases would be the logical version of reparation for an internationally 
wrongful act involving damage, the result would be an overlap with the con-
cept of liability—as liability is precisely all about compensating for damage. 
Second, therefore, as the conceptual dividing line between applying re-
sponsibility per Article VI—potentially giving rise to an obligation to com-
pensate—and applying liability per Article VII and the Liability Convention, 
essentially doing the same has never been properly defined.37 The two con-
cepts allocate the respective accountability quite differently. Responsibility 
applies for national activities in outer space where liability for cases where 
the state qualifies as a launching state. The result is an absence of any certainty 
on the precise potential legal consequences of many categories of relevant 
activities.38 
Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty, as further elaborated by the Liability 
Convention, establishes liability for damage caused by space objects, attrib-
uting such liability to states by way of four separately applicable criteria: 
“Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an 
object into outer space . . . and each State Party from whose territory or facil-
ity an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage . . . .”39 
Thus, regardless of the involvement of private sector entities such as de-
velopers, owners, launch operators, or payload operators of the space objects 
involved, the liability under international space law always accrues to one or 
more states. While this also, in principle, applied to cases where intergovern-
mental organizations were involved, here the liability of the member states of 
the international organization would always prevail.40 
 
Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001); see generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the 
Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001); see also Case Concerning the 
Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 I.C.J. 29 (Sept. 13). 
 37 See Frans von der Dunk, Liability Versus Responsibility in Space Law: Misconception 
or Misconstruction?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW 
OF OUTER SPACE 365–67 (AIAA) (1992). 
 38 Id. at 363–71. 
 39 Liability Convention, supra note 11, at art. I(c), V (emphasis added) (referring to the 
notion of the “launching State” could obviously give rise to more than one state being liable 
for the same case of damage, in which case joint and several liability applies). 
 40 Cf. id. at art. XXII(3): 
If an international intergovernmental organization is liable for damage 
by virtue of the provisions of this Convention, that organization and those 
of its members which are States Parties to this Convention shall be jointly 
and severally liable; provided, however, that: (a) any claim for compen-
sation in respect of such damage shall be first presented to the organiza-
tion; (b) only where the organization has not paid, within a period of six 
months, any sum agreed or determined to be due as compensation for 
such damage, may the claimant State invoke the liability of the members 
which are States Parties to this Convention for the payment of that sum. 
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With respect to private activities, however, no such clarity was provided. 
Given also that such liability is unlimited in principle,41 states obviously have 
a strong impetus to assert their system of “authorization and continuing su-
pervision,” required anyway under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, over 
all the space activities of the private sector that could give rise to their liability 
being invoked on the international plane.42 In other words, states would likely 
aim at establishing a system of authorization and continuing supervision of 
private sector activities involved in any launch, procurement of a launch, use 
of territory for a launch or use of facility for a launch which would trigger 
their international space law liability, should an accident occur. 
It is highly questionable, however, if and to what extent such private sector 
involvement could be classified as the “national activities in outer space . . . 
carried on . . . by non-governmental entities” which are targeted by Article VI. 
Neither Article VI, nor other relevant provisions of the space treaties have 
provided any clue as to what “national activities in outer space” would mean 
in this context.43 
III. THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL SPACE 
LAW: THE SOLUTIONS? 
Following initially rather academic debates which discussed three generic 
options for interpreting “national activities in outer space” for the purpose of 
the international responsibility of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty,44 it 
became clear that the solution to this question would have to be found in the 
realm of national space legislation (to be) adopted by relevant states in order 
to take care of their own international responsibilities and liabilities in the 
 
Note also that as per Article XXII(1) intergovernmental organizations could only come to 
fall within the scope of the Liability Convention subject to three conditions all fundamen-
tally requiring dedicated action of the member States. 
 41 Id. at art. XII: 
[t]he compensation which the launching State shall be liable to pay for 
damage under this Convention shall be determined in accordance with 
international law and the principles of justice and equity, in order to pro-
vide such reparation in respect of the damage as will restore the person, 
natural or juridical, State or international organization on whose behalf 
the claim is presented to the condition which would have existed if the 
damage had not occurred. 
 42 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. VI. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See also Frans von der Dunk, The Origins of Authorisation: Article VI of the Outer 
Space Treaty and International Space Law, in 6 NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION IN EUROPE: 
ISSUES OF AUTHORISATION OF PRIVATE SPACE ACTIVITIES IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS 
IN EUROPE SPACE COOPERATION 3, 7–8 (Frans von der Dunk ed., 2011), reprinted in SPACE 
CYBER AND TELECOMMS. L. PROGRAM FAC. PUBLICATIONS 1, 5–6 (2011), https://digitalcom 
mons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1068&context=spacelaw. 
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context of private sector participation in space activities. Though the Outer 
Space Treaty itself did not provide any further guidance on the issue, a major 
guideline did arise with the adoption of a U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) 
Resolution in 2013, “Recommendations on National Legislation Relevant to 
the Peaceful Exploration and Use of Outer Space.”45 In particular the Resolu-
tion provided: 
The State, taking into account its obligations as a launching 
State and as a State responsible for national activities in outer 
space under the United Nations treaties on outer space, should 
ascertain national jurisdiction over space activities carried out 
from territory under its jurisdiction and/or control; likewise, 
it should issue authorizations for and ensure supervision over 
space activities carried out elsewhere by its citizens and/or le-
gal persons established, registered or seated in territory under 
its jurisdiction and/or control, provided, however, that if an-
other State is exercising jurisdiction with respect to such ac-
tivities, the State should consider forbearing from duplicative 
requirements and avoid unnecessary burdens.46 
While UN Resolutions could provide evidence of or reflect customary in-
ternational law, ultimately whether these national space obligations under the 
resolution constitute custom must be deduced from state practice of the rele-
vant States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty accompanied by opinio juris. In 
other words, to constitute customary international law in this context, the 
scope of national space laws implementing the obligations of “authorization 
and continuing supervision” would be the ultimate reflection of the opinio 
juris of that State on what “national activities in outer space” of Article VI of 
the Outer Space Treaty really means. States, after all, would clearly focus on 
establishing systems of authorization and supervision in particular with regard 
to those private activities that they might be held responsible for on the inter-
national level under that same Article VI, and potentially the ones they might 
be held liable for under Article VII and the Liability Convention.47 
 
 45 G.A. Res. 68/74 (Dec. 11, 2013). 
 46 Id. (emphasis added); National Legislation Relevant to the Peaceful Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space on the Work Conducting Under Its Multi-Year Workplan, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.105/C.2/101, at 9 (2012) (echoing the concerns voiced in the quoted text from G.A. 
Res. 68/74). 
 47 Though not formally required to do so by the Outer Space Treaty or the Liability 
Convention, states would likely be keen on also authorizing and continuously supervising 
non-governmental activities potentially giving rise to their international liability pursuant 
to Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty or the Liability Convention. 
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Currently twenty-five countries address private sector space activities by 
way of a system of authorization and continuing supervision.48 In historical 
order, this concerned: 
• Norway (1969), with an Act entirely focused on launching;49 
• United States (1970), with confirmation that the 1934 Commu-
nications Act50 also applied to private satellite communications;51 
later statutes addressed private sector launch activities (the 1984 
Commercial Space Launch Act52), private sector satellite remote 
sensing (the 1984 Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization 
Act53), general private sector space efforts (the 1998 Commercial 
Space Act54) and private sector space resource exploitation interests 
(Title IV of the 2015 Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness 
Act55); 
• Sweden (1982), with two pieces of national space legislation fun-
damentally covering all space activities ratione materiae;56 
• United Kingdom (1986), with an initial Act addressing all space 
activities but limited in application to activities conducted by UK 
 
 48 The term “authorization” here is used in a general sense. Many countries and their 
laws and regulations refer not to “authorizations” but to “licenses,” “permissions,” “per-
mits,” “approvals” or other terms, but they all deal with the consent of a relevant sovereign 
state gives to private sector entities to conduct certain space activities subject to certain 
conditions. For the sake of this analysis, “supervision” is conceived as merely a specific 
part or extension of the concept of “authorization,” since any national space law providing 
details on supervision of non-governmental entities’ space activities almost by definition 
applies those to activities to be authorized by the same regime. See, e.g., I. Marboe, Na-
tional Space Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 134–35 (Frans von der Dunk & Fabio 
Tronchetti eds., 2015). 
 49 Act on Launching Objects from Norwegian Territory Etc. into Outer Space, U.N. 
OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS (June 13, 1969), https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourw 
ork/spacelaw/nationalspacelaw/norway/act_38_1969E.html. 
 50 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934). 
 51 In the Matter of Establishment of Domestic Communication-Satellite Facilities by 
Nongovernmental Entities, 22 F.C.C.2d 86, Appendix C, at 1 (1970). 
 52 Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055 (1984). Meanwhile, 
the Act has been repeatedly amended and is now codified as 51 U.S.C. Ch. 509–Commer-
cial Space Launch Activities. 
 53 Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-365, 98 Stat. 
451 (1984). The Act was superseded by the 1992 Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, but the 
licensing regime essentially remained intact. 
 54 Commercial Space Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-303, 112 Stat. 2843 (1998). 
 55 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129 Stat. 
704 (2015). 
 56 Act on Space Activities, 1982: 963 (1982); 1 NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION OF THE 
WORLD 398 (2001); SPACE LAW–BASIC LEGAL DOCUMENTS, E.II.1–2; 36 ZLW 1, 11 
(1987) [hereinafter SPACE LAW (1987)]; Decree on Space Activities, 1982:1069; 1 
NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION OF THE WORLD 399 (2001). 
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nationals, and a subsequent Act partially removing that re-
striction;57 
• South Africa (1993), with an Act addressing all space activities, 
though making some fundamental distinctions between launch 
and other space activities;58 
• Russia (1993), with a Law covering all potential private sector 
space and space-related activities;59 
• Ukraine (1996), basically following the Russia approach in this 
respect;60 
• Hong Kong (1997), which of course strictly speaking is not a sep-
arate country; however; when it reverted back from the United 
Kingdom to China it was given a version of the UK Outer Space 
Act of 198661 adapted to the new political situation, requiring li-
censes for any private space activity;62 
• Australia (1998), with an Act, in spite of its title, almost exclu-
sively focusing on launch and re-entry activities;63 
• Brazil (2001), with a general Edict from the Brazilian Space 
Agency including a Regulation addressing launch activities with 
Brazilian involvement;64 
 
 57 Outer Space Act 1986, c. 38 (Eng.); 1 NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION OF THE WORLD 
293 (2001) [hereinafter NAT’L SPACE]; SPACE LAW (1987), supra note 56, at E.I; 36 ZLW 
I, 12; Space Industry Act 2018, c. 5 (Eng.). 
 58 Space Affairs Act 84 of 1993 (S. Afr.). 
 59 Law of the Russian Federation on Space Activity, Aug. 20, 1993, No. 5663-1; NAT’L 
SPACE, supra note 57, at 101; United Nations/Nigeria Workshop on Space Law, in 
NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND POLICY: SELECTED TEXTS 162 (2005) [hereinafter United Na-
tions/Nigeria Workshop on Space Law]; Statute on Licensing Space Operations, Feb. 2, 
1996, No. 104; Order of the Government of the Russian Federation on Approval of the 
Regulation on Licensing of Space Activity, June 14, 2002; 2 NATIONAL SPACE 
LEGISLATION OF THE WORLD 302 (2002) [hereinafter 2 NAT’L SPACE]. 
 60 Law of Ukraine on Space Activities, Nov. 15, 1996, No. 502/96-VR; NAT’L SPACE, 
supra note 57, at 36, 48; United Nations/Nigeria Workshop on Space Law, supra note 59; 
The Law of Ukraine on Licensing of Certain Types of Economic Activity, June 1, 2000, 
No. 1775-III; The Law of Ukraine on Insurance, Mar. 7, 1996, No. 85/96-VR. 
 61 G.A. Res. 68/74 (Dec. 11, 2013). 
 62 Outer Space Ordinance (1999) Cap. 523 (H.K.) (conferring licensing and other pow-
ers on the Chief Executive to secure compliance with the international obligations of the 
People’s Republic of China with respect to the launching and operation of space objects 
and the carrying on of other activities in outer space); 2 NAT’L SPACE, supra note 59, at 
403. 
 63 Space Activities Act 1998 (Cth) Act No. 123 (Austl.), as amended by Space (Launches 
and Returns) Act 2018 (Cth) (Austl.). 
 64 Administrative Edict No. 27, 20 June 2001 (Braz.), 2 NAT’L SPACE, supra note 59, at 
377 (including Regulation regarding procedures and the definition of necessary require-
ments for the “request, evaluation, issuance, follow-up and supervision of licenses for car-
rying out and launching space activities on Brazilian territory.”). 
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• Belgium (2005), with a general Law encompassing “the activities 
of launching, flight operations or guidance of space objects”;65 
• Canada (2005), with an Act and a set of Regulations dealing with 
satellite remote operations primarily from a security perspec-
tive;66 
• South Korea (2005), with legislation effectively focused on 
launch activities;67 
• Netherlands (2007), with a very similar approach to Belgium;68 
• Germany (2007), with a law like Canada dealing with satellite 
remote operations mainly from a security perspective;69 
• France (2008), with a law like South Africa addressing all space 
activities though making some fundamental distinctions between 
launch and other space activities;70 
 
 65 Law on the Activities of Launching, Flight Operations or Guidance of Space Objects 
of September 17, 2005 (Belg.); CHRISTIAN BRÜNNER & EDITH WALTER, NATIONALES 
WELTRAUMRECHT–NATIONAL SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE, CHALLENGES FOR 
SMALL COUNTRIES 183 (2008) [hereinafter BRÜNNER & WALTER]; United Nations/Nigeria 
Workshop on Space Law, supra note 59, at 92. 
 66 Remote Sensing Space Systems Act, S.C. 2005, c. 45 (Can.); Remote Sensing Space 
Systems Regulations, SOR/2007-66 (Can.). 
 67 Space Development Promotion Act, Act No. 7538, May 31, 2005, translated in 33 J. 
SPACE L. 123, 175 (2007); Space Liability Act, Act No. 8852, Dec. 21, 2007; see generally 
National Space Law Database, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, 
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/nationalspacelaw/index.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 31, 2020). 
 68 Wet van 24 januari 2007, houdende regels omtrent ruimtevaartactiviteiten en de in-
stelling van een register van ruimtevoorwerpen (Wet ruimtevaartactiviteiten), Stb. 2007, 
1–2, 5 (Neth.) translated in United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Rules Concern-
ing Space Activities and the Establishment of a Registry of Space Objects (Space Activities 
Act) (2007), https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/nationalspacelaw/netherl 
ands/space_activities_actE.html; BRÜNNER & WALTER, supra note 65, at 202–06; see also 
Besluit van 19 januari 2015, houdende uitbreiding van de toepassing van de Wet 
ruimtevaartactiviteiten op het beheren van ongeleide satellieten (Besluit ongeleide satel-
lieten), Stb. 2015, 1 (Neth.) translated in United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 
Decree of 19 January 2015 Expanding the Scope of the Space Activities Act to Include the 
Control of Unguided Satellites (Unguided Satellites Decree) (2015), https://www.unoosa.o 
rg/documents/pdf/spacelaw/national/Netherlands_BZ116174A.pdf (augmenting the Space 
Activities Act). 
 69 Satellitendatensicherheitsgesetz [SatDSiG] [Satellite Data Security Act], Dec. 1, 
2007, BGBL. I at 58, ch. 2 (Ger.) translated in United Nations Office for Outer Space 
Affairs, Act to Give Protection Against the Security Risk to the Federal Republic of Ger-
many by the Dissemination of High-Grade Earth Remote Sensing Data (Satellite Data Se-
curity Act—SatDSiG) (2007), https://www.unoosa.org/documents/doc/spacelaw/national/ 
germany-satdsigGE.doc. 
 70 Loi 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales [Law 2008-518 of June 
3, 2008 on Space Operations], Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 4, 2008, p. 9169 translated in 34 J. SPACE L. 453 (2008). 
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• Nigeria (2010), where an Act establishing the national space 
agency and providing it with competences in the area of licensing 
focused on remote sensing but was later augmented by draft reg-
ulations addressing the whole gamut of space activities;71 
• Austria (2011), with a law covering all space activities compre-
hensively;72 
• Kazakhstan (2012), similarly with a Law covering all space ac-
tivities comprehensively;73 
• Indonesia (2013), for which the same holds true;74 
• Denmark (2016), also with a comprehensive law;75 
• Luxembourg (2017), with a Law focused exclusively on space 
resource exploitation;76 
• New Zealand (2017), with a law focused on launch and related 
activities;77 
• Greece (2018), with a law of comprehensive coverage ratione 
materiae;78 and 
 
 71 National Space Research and Development Agency Act No. (9) (2010) 97:98 O.G., 
A1249 (Nigeria). 
 72 AUSTRIAN FEDERAL LAW ON THE AUTHORISATION OF SPACE ACTIVITIES AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL SPACE REGISTRY [AUSTRIAN OUTER SPACE ACT] Dec. 28, 
2011, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, available at https://www.unoosa.org/docu 
ments/pdf/spacelaw/national/austria/austrian-outer-space-actE.pdf (Austria). 
 73 Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Space Activities, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE 
AFFAIRS, https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/national/kazakhstan/528-IV_2 
012-01-06E.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2020). 
 74 Law of the Republic of Indonesia on Space Activities, Nr. 21, of 6 August 2013; State 
Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia (2013), Nr. 133. 
 75 Outer Space Act (Lov om aktiviteter i det ydre rum), passed by Parliament with the third 
treatment, May 3, 2016; Parliament Gazette, 2015–17, No. L 128. 
 76 Law on the Exploration and Utilization of Space Resources (Loi du 20 juillet 2017 sur 
l’exploration et l’utilisation des ressources de l’espace); of 20 July 2017, published July 
28, 2017; http://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/2017/07/20/a674/jo. Note that currently 
another law is under development in Luxembourg which will address all space activities. 
Jeff Foust, Luxembourg Extends Space Resources Work Through New Agreements with 
NASA and ESA, SPACENEWS (Oct. 23, 2019), https://spacenews.com/luxembourg-extends- 
space-resources-work-through-new-agreements-with-nasa-and-esa/ (“The [Luxembourg 
Space Agency] expects to launch a venture capital fund by the end of the year, while the 
government will consider a new comprehensive national space law in 2020.”). 
 77 Outer Space and High-Altitude Activities Act 2017 (N.Z.). 
 78 Nomos (2017:4508) Adeiodótisi Diastimikón Drastiriotíton-Katachórisi sto Ethnikó 
Mitróo Diastimikón Antikeiménon–Ídrysi Ellinikoú Diastimikoú Organismoú kai Loipés 
Diatáxeis [Licensing of Space Activities—Registration in the National Register of Space 
Objects—Establishment of a Hellenic Space Agency and Other Provisions] EPHEMERIS TES 
KYVERNESEOS TES HELLENIKES DEMOKRATIAS [E.K.E.D.] 2017, A:200 (Greece). 
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• Portugal (2019), likewise with a law of comprehensive coverage 
ratione materiae.79 
From the analysis of those twenty-five national space laws, it appears that 
states have overwhelmingly chosen to apply their licensing regimes to those 
non-governmental activities already subject to a state’s jurisdiction anyway. 
Except for Belgium and the Netherlands, all countries with a ratione materiae 
comprehensive licensing scheme now, in principle, apply both personal and 
territorial jurisdiction. Except for the United States, South Africa, and France, 
countries do so across the board, regardless of the particular category of space 
activities concerned. Most of the national regimes more limited in scope ra-
tione materiae also follow this approach. Thus, the proper interpretation of 
“national activities in outer space” is in line with UNGA Resolution 68/74. It 
encompasses all private sector space activities conducted from within the ter-
ritorial and personal jurisdiction of the state at issue. The few exceptions must 
be viewed as rather idiosyncratic cases.80 
IV. CONCLUSION 
From the perspective of the global governance of space activities then, at 
least in the scoping of national space legislation to cover state responsibility 
and, as appropriate, liability, a convergence of approaches can be seen, even 
if seemingly ad hoc bottom-up developments rather than by conscious design. 
It is by now at least axiomatic that, unless States have no private space activ-
ities at all taking place under their aegis and prohibited them fundamentally, 
they would be legally required to ensure proper integration of such activities 
in the system of international space law by way of national space legislation. 
Those States which do not have such legislation are gently urged to establish 
them, and the national space laws established so far show the way. 
As the clause of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty on “national activi-
ties in outer space” has almost uniformly been interpreted as including activ-
ities conducted by nationals and from national territory, in many cases ex-
tended moreover to national quasi-territory such as ships and aircraft, at least 
in terms of the structure of the governance of space activities, a rather coher-
ent system has emerged. What remains still unresolved in this context, how-
ever, apart from the many substantive differences in content of the existing 
national space laws and regulations, is the complex overlap of state responsi-
bility with state liability and the resulting differences regarding the extent to 
which also the latter would be fully covered through national space legisla-
tion. It still remains to be seen to which extent such lack of coherence would 
 
 79 Decree-Law No. 16/2019 of 22 January (Port.). 
 80 See generally Frans von der Dunk, Scoping National Space Law: The True Meaning 
of ‘National Activities in Outer Space’ of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INT’L INST. OF SPACE LAW 2019 (forthcoming 2020). 
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present a major obstacle to the prosperous further development of the human 
space endeavor for the benefit of all humankind, but this unfortunately would 
seem rather likely. An effective and coherent system of governance of outer 
space and space activities after all requires a considerable amount of coherent 
global will—in this case, it is not “the law” which remains the ultimate show-
stopper. 
 
